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Abstract: This paper examines whether the Sharpe ratios constructed from survey forecasts are favorable 
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Since Shiller (1982) and Mehra and Prescott (1985) questioned why the gap between the 
rates of returns from stocks and bonds is so large, the equity premium puzzle has 
attracted attention from many economists. These numerous explanations can be 
categorized into three approaches. The first approach is to explain the puzzle under full 
rationality by introducing more complex utility functions. Epstein and Zin (1991) and 
Weil (1989) use a utility function which breaks the tight relation between the risk 
aversion coefficient and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Constantinides (1990) 
has introduced the utility function with habit formation in this literature, and Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999) succeed in explaining the puzzle and the predictability of stock 
returns of the dividend-price ratio following the habit formation approach.   
The second approach explains the puzzle by introducing irrationality into the 
beliefs under the traditional power utility function. Rietz (1988) shows that the puzzle can 
be explained if consumers believe that the disastrous situation can occur with higher 
probability than the historical data imply. Recently, Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) 
also succeeded in matching the first and second moments of the equity premium as well 
as the predictability of stock returns, by assuming that the representative consumer, with 
the traditional power utility function, has distorted beliefs in a particular way such that 
the consumer expects that both expansions and contractions end more quickly than the 
data suggest.  
  The third approach is to explain the puzzle using market frictions such as 
borrowing constraints, short-sale constraints, and so on. Heaton and Lucas (1996) show 
the potential of this approach and Luttmer (1999) estimates the magnitude of such 
frictions using the first-order conditions from utility maximization.    2
  Although Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000), 
among many explanations, have succeeded in explaining various aspects of the asset 
pricing phenomena, including the equity premium puzzle, the puzzle still remains a 
puzzle. Since both approaches are based on completely different mechanisms to explain 
the puzzle, we still do not know which one presents a better description about the cause 
of the puzzle. In other words, since the stylized facts in the financial market can be 
explained by both models, it is hard for economists to judge the correct mechanism by 
looking at financial and consumption data.
1 Hence, the main purpose of this paper is to 
derive different implications on consumers’ expectations from both models and to 
examine which implications are more supported by investigating the survey forecasts. 
  Since Campbell and Cochrane’s model retains rational expectations while 
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark’s is based on irrational expectations, the two models’ 
implications on survey forecasts are different. While Campbell and Cochrane (1999) 
would predict that survey forecasts are rational, Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) would 
claim that forecasts are excessively pessimistic over expansions and excessively 
optimistic over contractions. Using the Livingston survey forecasts for the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 index (S&P 500), which is being managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, this paper conducts various tests on these implications. T-tests are 
conducted to examine which model can better explain the distribution of the Sharpe ratios 
constructed from the survey forecasts. To check whether the Sharpe ratios from the 
survey forecasts are rational, rationality tests allowing a three-dimensional structure for 
forecast errors (individual bias, aggregate shocks, and idiosyncratic errors) are 
                                                 
1 Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarlini (1999) show that in a linear-quadratic environment, a model with rational 
expectations and habit is observationally equivalent to a model with a particular form of distorted beliefs.   3
conducted.
2 With the same econometric framework as the rationality test, structural break 
tests are used to investigate whether forecasters’ biases vary over the business cycle. 
  The test results appear more favorable to Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). The 
expected equity premium implied by the survey forecasts are, on average, more 
pessimistic than the actual realized equity premium. Almost all individual economists 
who reported their forecasts have significant bias and their biases appear to vary over the 
business cycle. As Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) assume, the biases in the tests imply 
that forecasts are excessively pessimistic over expansions and excessively optimistic over 
contractions. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 briefly summarizes the two 
models from Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000), and 
derives implications from them. Section 2 discusses the data used and explains how the 
variables in the test are constructed. Section 3 presents test results from the T-tests, bias 
tests, and the structural break tests for the biases. Section 4 contains the concluding 
remarks.  
 
1. Models of the Equity Premium and Empirical Implications 
To understand the equity premium puzzle, suppose that the representative consumer lives 
in an economy described by the Lucas (1978) tree model. The representative consumer 
must decide whether to sacrifice some consumption in order to add another unit of the 
risky asset to his/her portfolio. The risky asset in this economy is a claim to the future 
                                                 
2 Due to possible correlations in forecast errors, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used for 
the test. This method of rationality test was developed by Davies and Lahiri (1995).   4
stream of the non-storable endowment called dividends ( t D ). Then, the consumer’s 














c C U E
t β  
 s.t.  t t t t t t A D P A P C ) ( 1 + ≤ + +  
where  0 E  denotes the conditional expectation given information at time 0,  t C  denotes 
consumption at time t,  ) (⋅ U   denotes the utility function,  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β   denotes the time 
discount rate,  t P  denotes the price of a share of the risky asset, and  t A  is the consumer’s 
shareholdings at time t. The first order conditions for the above problem can be reduced 
to 
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≡ . In addition, the corresponding 
condition for the risk-free asset in this economy can be written as 
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where 
f
t R 1 +  is the return on the risk-free asset between time t and t+1. 
  The equity premium is the difference between  1 + t R  and 
f
t R 1 +  in equations (1) and 
(2). With the assumptions of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function 
and the lognormal consumption growth, equations (1) and (2) imply 
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where  ) (⋅ σ  is the standard deviation and γ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The 
ratio of mean excess returns to standard deviation is known as the Sharpe ratio. Equation   5
(3) shows the largest possible bound of the Sharpe ratio in general, which is known as the 
Hansen-Jagannathan bound. However, the equality holds in the Lucas model because 
t t C D =  at the equilibrium, and because consumption growth and consumption claim 
returns are conditionally perfectly correlated. 
The equity premium puzzle can be shown using Equation (3). In the US, the 
postwar real aggregate stock return over real return on the Treasury bill rate is 8%, on 
average, while the standard deviation of the aggregate stock return is 16%. Since the 
standard deviation of the aggregate non-durable and services consumption growth is 
about 1%, Equation (3) implies that the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the 
consumer should be 50.
3 Since traditional risk aversion values are 1 to 10, the Sharpe 
ratio is too large to be explained by the consumption-theory reflected in Equation (3). 
Since Shiller (1982) and Mehra and Prescott (1985) pointed out the problem, 
there have been numerous explanations to resolve the puzzle. Among them, Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999) and Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) can consistently explain the 
equity premium puzzle as well as other puzzles in the financial market. The former, 
which takes a more common approach, explains the puzzle under full rationality by 
introducing more complex utility functions. The latter explains the puzzle by introducing 
distorted beliefs under the traditional power utility function. The following sub-sections 
briefly examine the mechanisms of each approach and derive empirical implications. 
 
A. Rational Expectation Approach 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) succeed in resolving not only the equity premium puzzle,  
                                                 
3 The values for real aggregate stock return, real Treasury bill return, and the standard deviation of the 
aggregate consumption growth are taken from Cochrane (2001, Chapter 1).   6
but also the predictability and volatility puzzles, coherently, by using the utility function 
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As a result, the Sharpe ratio with Campbell and Cochrane’s utility function is 
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where ) ln( t t S s ≡ . Campbell and Cochrane choose the sensitivity function,  ) ( t s λ  so that 
)] ( 1 [ t s λ γ +  has a positive relation with the local curvature of their utility function, which 
is 
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As Equation (6) shows, the local curvature of the consumer’s utility function, which 
reflects the consumer’s attitude toward risk, depends on  t S  and can be high even with a 
low value for γ . This dependency is reflected by  ) ( t s λ  in Equation (5), and the Sharpe 
ratio can be greater than the bound derived from the traditional CRRA utility function. 
Furthermore, the local curvature can explain the countercyclical Sharpe ratio. As 
consumption falls toward habit during a recession, the consumer becomes more risk   7
averse and both  t η  and  ) ( t s λ  become higher. As a result, the Sharpe ratio becomes high 
in recessions.  
  Under Campbell and Cochrane’s model, one can think of two testable empirical 
implications on survey forecasts. If forecasters have the utility function in Equation (4), 
then the Sharpe ratio constructed by survey forecasts must be greater than  ) ln ( C t ∆ γσ , 
since the minimum of  ) ( t s λ   is 0. Furthermore, since the consumer’s expectation is 
rational, the Sharpe ratio constructed by survey forecasts must be unbiased when it is 
compared with the actual realized Sharpe ratio. These implications can be summarized as 
follows. 
 
Implication 1. Suppose that the consumer has the utility function as in Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999). Then, 
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Implication 1 demonstrates that the equity premium puzzle will disappear if one 
compares the Sharpe ratio with the correct bound, which is  )] ( 1 )[ ln ( t s C λ γσ + ∆  rather 
than ) ln ( C t ∆ γσ . The correct bound incorporates the time-varying risk premium through 
) ( t s λ . 
 
Implication 2. Suppose that the consumer has the utility function as in Campbell and 
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Implication 2 holds because Campbell and Cochrane’s model retains rational 
expectations. Hence, the Sharpe ratio under Campbell and Cochrane (1999) must be 
unbiased. However, it is important to note that Implications 1 and 2 can be derived from 
any model which is successful in explaining the equity premium puzzle with rational 
expectations.  
 
B. Irrational Expectation Approach 
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) also succeed in matching the first and second moments 
of the equity premium by assuming that the representative consumer with the traditional 
CRRA utility function has distorted beliefs. The representative consumer in Cecchetti, 
Lam, and Mark (2000) has distorted beliefs in a particular way such that the consumer 
expects that both expansions and contractions end more quickly than the data suggest. In 
other words, the consumer is excessively optimistic over contractions and excessively 
pessimistic over expansions.  
The reason that this type of distortion in beliefs can explain the puzzle can be 
shown as follows. Since the consumer is excessively pessimistic over expansions,  
] [ ] [
~
1 1 + + < t t t t C E C E  over expansions (where  ] [
~
⋅ t E  denotes the expectation formed under 
distorted beliefs).  ] [ ] [
~
1 1 + + < t t t t C E C E  implies that  )] ( ' [ )] ( ' [
~
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4 Assuming that the consumer is rational in all other aspects, 
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Although the opposite direction holds during contractions, the longer duration of 
expansions can make the Sharpe ratio under the rational expectation greater than 
) ln ( C t ∆ γσ , on average. Hence, one can derive the following implications. 
 
Implication 3. Suppose that the consumer has distorted beliefs as in Cecchetti, Lam, and 
Mark (2000). Then, regardless of expansions or contractions, 
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Implication 3 states that the Sharpe ratio under the distorted beliefs rather than rational 
expectations satisfies the prediction of the consumption-based asset pricing theory. This 
can be directly investigated by the use of survey forecasts. 
 
Implication 4. Suppose that the consumer has distorted beliefs as in Cecchetti, Lam, and 
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Also, there exists  0 > ϕ  over contractions such that 
                                                 
4 This is generally true when there is no distorted belief about the consumption growth. Cecchitti, Lam and 
Mark (2000) obtain the best results assuming no distorted beliefs about the consumption growth, but 
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Implication 4 states the Sharpe ratio under distorted beliefs will be biased. Furthermore, 
the bias will be positive over expansions and negative over contractions. 
 
2. Data and Construction of Variables 
A. Data 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine which implications in the previous section 
are supported by the data. To achieve this purpose, this paper constructs the Sharpe ratio 
using economists’ survey forecasts rather than using the realized data under the rational 
expectation hypothesis. Because both Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Cecchetti, Lam, 
and Mark (2000) have succeeded in matching the first and second moments of the equity 
premium in spite of fundamentally different mechanisms, actual data alone cannot 
distinguish which approach is more promising. Hence, the examination with survey 
forecasts is particularly worthwhile. To conduct this exercise, this paper uses the 
Livingston stock market forecasts to construct the Sharpe ratio.  
  Since 1946, the Livingston survey has collected forecasts for important 
macroeconomic variables from academic or business economists twice a year. It is the 
oldest continuous survey of economists’ expectations. The survey was originally 
conducted by Joseph A. Livingston, a columnist in Philadelphia. Since his death in 1989, 
however, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey and has   11
continued it.
5 Since stock market forecasts were included in the survey in 1952, the stock 
market forecasts have experienced two major changes.  
First, the variable to be forecasted for the stock market changed in 1990. The 
Livingston survey originally asked economists about forecasts for the Standard and 
Poor’s 400 industrial index until 1989. However, from the December 1990 survey on, 
economists have been asked to report forecasts on the Standard and Poor’s 500 composite 
index (the S&P 500).  
  Second, beginning with the survey of June 1992, participating economists have 
been asked to provide forecasts of the S&P 500 for the month when the forecasts are 
made, in addition to 6-months and 12-months-ahead forecasts.
6 The reason for this new 
forecast is to help in the calculation of better 6-months and 12-months-ahead forecasts for 
the rate of return on the S&P 500 (or 6/12-months-ahead forecasts for the inflation rate or 
growth rates of other variables). To take advantage of these new forecasts and to maintain 
the consistency in the forecasts, this paper uses forecasts of the S&P 500 index contained 
in the June 1992 survey and thereafter. 
 
B. Construction of the Sharpe ratio from the Livingston Survey 
This sub-section discusses the construction of the Sharpe ratio using the Livingston 
Survey. The Livingston Survey is published twice a year, in June and December. Since 
the survey of June 1992, participating economists are asked to report the current month, 
6-months, and 12-months-ahead forecasts. For example, forecasts of the S&P 500 index 
as of June 30 of the current year, December 31 of the current year, and June 30 of the 
                                                 
5 For the survey of previous studies with the Livingston dataset, see Croushore (1997). 
6 This change is applied to all other variables in the Livingston survey.   12
following year are reported in the June surveys. However, the base index, which is the 
S&P 500 index when the forecasts are made, is not reported. As a result, the base index, 
which may differ across economists, even in the same survey, is unknown.    
  Facing this uncertainty in the base index, some previous research assumed that 
forecasts were made at the end of April or October, and computed forecasts of 8-month 
and 14-month stock market rates of return.
7 Others computed only forecasts of 6-month 
stock market rates of return using 6-months and 12-months-ahead forecasts of the stock  
market index instead of using the base index. (Dokko and Edelstein (1989))  
Since the current month forecasts have been collected from the survey of June 
1992, this paper computes forecasts of both 6-month and 12-month stock market rates of 
return assuming that the base index is equal to the current month forecasts. Although this 
approximation is not perfect, it would be better than previous ones because the time gap 
between the true base index and the current month forecasts appears shorter than the gap 
between the true base index and the index at the end of April or October. In addition, this 
method can construct both 6-month and 12-month stock market rates of return without 
any sacrifice between the two.  
  When computing forecasts of the stock market rate of return with June surveys 
(December surveys), dividends paid out in May (November) are included since the 
expectations of dividends are not collected. Also, when computing forecasts of the stock 
market rate of return under the assumption that the stock is the consumption claim, as in 
Lucas (1978), the dividends are replaced with per capita consumption data. These 
adjustments are not expected to cause large distortions, since dividends are not as volatile 
as stock prices and since dividends are a small component in stock returns compared to 
                                                 
7 Carlson (1977) is the first to recognize this response-timing problem in the Livingston survey.   13
the change in stock prices. For forecasts of the risk-free rate of return, forecasts for the 
current month 3-month Treasury bill rate are used, which have also been collected from 
the survey of June 1992.  
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
This section uses the Sharpe ratio constructed from survey forecasts, and tests which 
implications in Section 1 are supported. This exercise is expected to provide some 
evidence on what has caused the equity premium puzzle between complex utility 
functions and distorted beliefs.  
  
A. The Bound of the Sharpe Ratio 
This sub-section tests Implications 1 and 3 in Section 1 by comparing the unconditional 
average Sharpe ratio constructed from survey forecasts and its implied unconditional 
bound, which is ) ln ( C ∆ γσ . The reasons that the unconditional mean and standard 
deviation of the Sharpe ratio are used in the comparison are that the survey does not 
collect forecasts on the second moment of return or the growth rate of consumption, and 
that the use of unconditional moments enables one to avoid the effect of time-varying 
standard deviation of stock market rates of return. Hence, this paper uses the average 
equity premium from survey forecasts for ] [ 1 1
f
t t R R E + + − , while the postwar standard 
deviation of aggregate stock return (0.16 per year) is used for the unconditional standard 
deviation of stock market rates of return. Also, ) ln ( C ∆ σ  is assumed to be 0.01 per year, 
which is the standard deviation of the aggregate non-durable and services consumption   14
growth in the US after World War II.
8 Both  ] [ 1 + t R σ  and ) ln ( C ∆ σ  are adjusted to the 
length of the forecast horizon in the Sharpe ratio. 
   The strategy to test Implications 1 and 3 is to conduct one-sided or two-sided t-
tests assuming that the representative consumer can be interpreted as a consumer who has 
average expectations and that the forecasts sample is from a normal distribution. The null 





































. For the 
tests, the relative risk aversion of the traditional CRRA function is assumed to be 2, 5, 
and 8.472.  2 = γ  is the value chosen by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and  472 . 8 = γ  is 
the value which gives one of the best results in Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000).  5 = γ  
is approximately the average of the two. Since Implications 1 and 3 must always hold, 
these implications must also hold unconditionally.  
This paper uses Livingston survey data from June 1992 to December 2001. 
During the sample period, the data include 20 target periods, 2 forecast horizons (6-
month and 12-month), and 94 economists participated in the survey. Data for the actual 
S&P 500 monthly price index, S&P 500 monthly dividend yield, and three-month 
Treasury bill rates are taken from the DRI database. Data for the per capita consumption 
on non-durable goods and services are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis FRED database.
9 The total number of observations for the 6-month and 12-month 
                                                 
8 Since there is no irrationality on the second moments of stock return or consumption growth rate in both 
models, the assumption of these values would not be strong. 
9 The web site address is http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/.   15
Sharpe ratios are 524 and 516. P-values under each null hypothesis are shown in Tables 1 
through 4. 
  Tables 1 and 2 show the results when per capita consumption is used in 
calculating the expected stock returns assuming that the stock is the consumption claim. 
Tables 3 and 4 show the results from the use of the aggregate dividend data assuming that 
the stock is the dividend claim. As the results are almost identical, henceforth this paper 
concentrates on the results in Tables 1 and 2.  
The first row of each panel in the tables shows test results using all observations, 
since the above implications must hold regardless of individual economists or calendar 
time. As individual characteristics can affect the results, the second row shows the results 
when the average Sharpe ratio from individual economists’ averages is used. The next 
rows in each panel show the test results after narrowing observations forecasted by 
economists who reported more than 50% of the time, not necessarily consecutively. 
There are 22 economists who satisfy this criterion, and their forecasts can generate 285 
expected equity premiums for both the 6-month and 12-month horizons. The third row 
shows the results when the average Sharpe ratio is calculated from all 285 observations. 
The last row shows the results using the average Sharpe ratio from these 22 economists’ 
averages.  
With all 524 (516) observations and  2 = γ , for example, the p-value for the 
hypothesis from Implication 1 is 0.1492 (0.9014) for the 6-month (12-month) Sharpe 
ratio, while the p-value for the hypothesis from Implication 3 is 0.2984 (0.1972). Hence, 
neither hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level in this case.    16
  As shown in Tables 1 and 2, although both hypotheses appear to be increasingly 
rejected as γ  increases, Implication 1 is rejected more often than Implication 3 at the 5% 
significance level (5/24 vs. 3/24). In addition, the results under Implication 1 seem to be 
more sensitive to the change in γ . Moreover, the p-values for Implication 3 derived from 
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) are higher than the p-values for Implication 1 from 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) in 20 cases out of 24 cases. This is not because two-sided 
tests are conducted for Implication 3 while one-sided tests are conducted for Implication 
1. This is because the average Sharpe ratios lie within the bound in most cases. Only 
when the average Sharpe ratio is far beyond the bound, is the p-value for Implication 1 
greater than that for Implication 3.  
All these results imply that the distribution of the survey Sharpe ratios can more 
likely be observed under Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) than under Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999). In other words, these results suggest that investors may not be as 
optimistic as the rational expectation and actual data imply. 
 
B. Bias Test 
This sub-section examines which implication has more supportive evidence between 
Implications 2 and 4. Implication 2 states that the Sharpe ratios constructed from survey 
forecasts are unbiased forecasts of the actual Sharpe ratio under the model of Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999). However, Implication 4 means that forecasted Sharpe ratios are 
lower than the actual one over expansions and higher over contractions under the model   17
of Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). Hence, the examination of whether biases exist in 
the forecasted Sharpe ratio is the main concern of this sub-section.
10  
  The bias test has a long history in the context of the rationality test of survey 
forecasts. Actually, the Livingston data has been widely used for this purpose. However, 
the bias test in this paper is different from the previous tests with the Livingston data in 
the following two respects. First, this paper uses the current month forecasts as the base 
index to compute the expected aggregate stock return. Since the current month forecasts 
have only been reported since 1992, this method was not available to researchers prior to 
1992. Second, adopting the recently developed method by Davies and Lahiri (1995) for 
the rationality test with micro survey data, this paper uses individual forecasts for the bias 
test rather than consensus or average forecasts. 
  Using individual forecasts enables this paper not only to have more observations 
for the test, but also to avoid inconsistent estimation with the average forecasts, as 
pointed out by Bonham and Cohen (2001). Like Davies and Lahiri (1995), this paper also 
allows a three-dimensional structure for forecast errors; individual bias, aggregate shocks, 
and idiosyncratic errors. Hence, the forecast errors can be decomposed as follows: 
  ith th i ith th F A ε θ φ + + = −        ( 1 3 )  
where th A  is the actual Sharpe ratio at t,  ith F  is the forecast for the Sharpe ratio at t, made 
by economist i,  h-months prior to t,  i φ  is  economist  i’s individual bias,  th θ is the 
aggregate shock, and  ith ε   is an idiosyncratic shock.  th θ   is assumed to represent the 
cumulative effect of 6-month shocks between h-months prior to t and t, and 6-month 
shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other and have constant variance. 
                                                 
10 As the consumer in both models is rational in the second moments of the stock market rate of return, 
time-varying standard deviation of stock market rate of return will not affect the results for the bias test.   18
  Under this set-up,  i φ  can be consistently estimated by regressing forecast errors 
( ithd thd F A − ) on the individual-specific dummy matrix.
11 Implication 3 predicts that the 
i φ s will be insignificantly different from zero, while Implication 4 states that  i φ s are 
significantly positive over expansions and significantly negative over contractions. To 
conduct this test, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used realizing that the 
aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shock can create correlation between forecasts errors 
with the same t, with the same economist, or with the overlapped aggregate shocks.
12 
Hence, the following forecast error covariance structure is used for the GMM covariance 
estimator for individual biases. 
     ) , (
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 h t i h t h t i h t F A F A Cov − −  
6 / ) , min(
2
2 1
2 τ σ h h i + =   2 1 2 1 , t t i i i = = = ∀ , 
 6 / ) , min(
2
2 1 τ h h =    2 1 2 1 , t t i i = ≠ ∀ , 
 6 / ) , min(
2
2 1 τ h h =    2 2 1 1 2 1 , h t h t i i − = − ≠ ∀  
 
2 τ =       < − ∀ 2 1 t t 12 months,  12 2 1 = = h h , 
 =  0     otherwise, 
where
2
i σ  is the variance of the idiosyncratic shock, and 
2 τ  is the variance of the 6-
month aggregate shock.  
To obtain a sensible estimate of  i φ  and the test results, this test also uses 22 
economists who reported more than 50% of the time, not necessarily consecutively. Since 
                                                 
11 One can consider a bias test to examine whether the coefficient for forecasts is equal to one. However, 
this test is inconsistent for the estimation of the coefficient in the pooled regression. See Bonham and 
Cohen (2001).   
12 For example, 12-month forecasts made in June 1992 and 6/12-month forecasts made in December 1992 
have overlapped aggregate shocks between January 1993 and June 1993.   19
their forecasts are not necessarily consecutive, every row and column of the error 
covariance matrix which corresponds to a missing observation in the forecast vector was 
deleted. The results are shown in Table 5. In Table 5, the results from the use of per 
capita consumption data are also almost identical to those from dividends data. 
  Since Campbell and Cochrane (1999) retain rational expectations, their 
implication is that  i φ   will be insignificant regardless of expansions or contractions. 
However, the results in Table 5 show that all individual biases are positive, and that 20 
out of 22 biases are highly significant. The economist’s identification numbers in the 
Livingston survey for the insignificant bias are 389 and 444. Therefore, survey data do 
not seem to support Implication 3. Furthermore, positive  i φ s may result from the long-
lasting expansions during the 1990s, which could be supportive evidence for Cecchetti, 
Lam, and Mark (2000). 
  To check this possibility, I divide the sample period into two sub-periods and 
examine whether the  i φ s are equal or different over the two periods. The first sub-period 
is from June 1992 to December 2000, and the second sub-period is from June 2001 to 
December 2001. This division is based on the decision of National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee, which says that the last expansion 
ended in March 2001. Among 22 economists, 13 economists reported forecasts in either 
the June 2001 survey or the December 2001 survey. Table 6 shows the results from 
forecasts formed by 10 economists who have more than one forecast during the second 
period.
13 The results in Table 6 show that all economists have significantly positive  i φ s 
over expansions, and that all but two (the economists with identification numbers 250 and 
                                                 
13 The results are almost identical when observations from three additional economists are included in the 
test.   20
276) have significantly negative  i φ s over contractions. Furthermore, an F-test for the 
hypothesis that the  i φ s from the first sub-period are equal to those from the second sub-
period shows that the hypothesis can be rejected. The F-statistic is over 13. Although the 
sample period in this paper has one incomplete business cycle, the results are consistent 
with the seemingly ad hoc assumption in Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper compares the implications from the rational expectation approach (Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999)) with those from the irrational expectation approach (Cecchetti, 
Lam, and Mark (2000)), and examines which implications are supported more by the 
survey forecast data. Since both approaches have succeeded in providing consistent 
explanations for the equity premium puzzle, data on stock returns, bond returns and 
consumption cannot distinguish which approach is more plausible. Hence, the 
examination with the survey forecast data is a meaningful exercise. 
The test results are not favorable to the existing rational approach. The average 
Sharpe ratio constructed from the Livingston survey forecasts is not greater than 
) ln ( C ∆ γσ   in most cases. This means that the distribution of the Sharpe ratios 
constructed from the survey forecasts can be observed more likely under Cecchetti, Lam, 
and Mark (2000) than under Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 20 out of 22 individual 
economists have significant biases in forecasts. Furthermore, these biases appear to vary 
over the business cycle. The biases appear to cause forecasts to be pessimistic over 
expansions and optimistic over contractions. This variation in the bias is consistent with 
the seemingly ad hoc assumption in Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000).   21
Using a spectral utility analysis, Otrok, Ravikumar, and Whiteman (2002) 
recently showed that a utility function with habit formation could not explain the 
historical trend of the equity premium in the US data.  In addition to their results, the 
results in this paper show that predictions from the habit formation approach are not 
consistent with survey forecasts. These results may shed light on the direction of future 
research. 
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TABLE 1 
6-month Sharpe Ratio and Bound with Consumption Data 
 
) ln ( : 0 C SR H ∆ ≥ γσ    Obs  R S   Std 
2 = γ   5 = γ   472 . 8 = γ  
All 
Observations 
524  -0.0070  0.4652 0.1492 0.0188 0.0005 
Across 
Economists 




285  -0.0065  0.4781 0.2337 0.0704 0.0099 
Across  22 
Economists 
22  -0.0258  0.2748 0.2513 0.1541 0.0791 
: 0 H ) ln ( C SR ∆ = γσ    Obs  R S   Std 
2 = γ  5 = γ  472 . 8 = γ  
All 
Observations 
524  -0.0070  0.4652 0.2984 0.0376 0.0011 
Across 
Economists 




285  -0.0065  0.4781 0.4673 0.1408 0.0198 
Across  22 
Economists 
22  -0.0258  0.2748 0.5026 0.3083 0.1582 
 
Notes) 1. Obs is the number of observations in the sample.   
2.  R S  is the average Sharpe ratio from the survey forecasts. 
3. Std is the standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio from the survey forecasts. 
  4. The 4
th and 5
th rows in each panel (Observations from 22 Economists and 
Across 22 Economists) show results with observations forecasted by  
economists who reported more than 50% of the time, not necessarily  
consecutively. 
 5.  ) ln ( : 0 C SR H ∆ ≥ γσ  is the null hypothesis of Implication 1 derived from  
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
6. : 0 H ) ln ( C SR ∆ = γσ  is the null hypothesis of Implication 3 derived from  
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). 
7. Numbers in the 5
th, 6
th and 7
th columns in each panel show the p-values for 
each hypothesis. 
8. Per capita consumption data are used for the test assuming that the stock is the 
consumption claim.   25
TABLE 2 
12-month Sharpe Ratio and Bound with Consumption Data 
 
) ln ( : 0 C SR H ∆ ≥ γσ    Obs  R S   Std 
2 = γ   5 = γ   472 . 8 = γ  
All 
Observations 
516  0.0473  0.4798 0.9014 0.4486 0.0384 
Across 
Economists 




285  0.0394  0.5156 0.7368 0.3641 0.0694 
Across  22 
Economists 
22  0.0213  0.3249 0.5073 0.3414 0.1851 
: 0 H ) ln ( C SR ∆ = γσ    Obs  R S   Std 
2 = γ  5 = γ  472 . 8 = γ  
All 
Observations 
516  0.0473  0.4798 0.1972 0.8973 0.0768 
Across 
Economists 




285  0.0394  0.5156 0.5263 0.7282 0.1387 
Across  22 
Economists 
22  0.0213  0.3249 0.9854 0.6827 0.3702 
 
Notes) 1. Obs is the number of observations in the sample.   
2.  R S  is the average Sharpe ratio from the survey forecasts. 
3. Std is the standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio from the survey forecasts. 
  4. The 4
th and 5
th rows in each panel (Observations from 22 Economists and 
Across 22 Economists) show results with observations forecasted by  
economists who reported more than 50% of the time, not necessarily  
consecutively. 
 5.  ) ln ( : 0 C SR H ∆ ≥ γσ  is the null hypothesis of Implication 1 derived from  
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
6. : 0 H ) ln ( C SR ∆ = γσ  is the null hypothesis of Implication 3 derived from  
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). 
7. Numbers in the 5
th, 6
th and 7
th columns in each panel show the p-values for 
each hypothesis. 
8. Per capita consumption data are used for the test assuming that the stock is the 
consumption claim. 
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TABLE 3 
6-month Sharpe Ratio and Bound with Dividend Data 
 
) ln ( : 0 C SR H ∆ ≥ γσ    Obs  R S   Std 
2 = γ   5 = γ   472 . 8 = γ  
All 
Observations 
524  -0.0057  0.4647 0.1648 0.0219 0.0006 
Across 
Economists 




285  -0.0053  0.4773 0.2456 0.0755 0.0109 
Across  22 
Economists 
22  -0.0247  0.2745 0.2572 0.1583 0.0816 
: 0 H ) ln ( C SR ∆ = γσ    Obs  R S   Std 
2 = γ  5 = γ  472 . 8 = γ  
All 
Observations 
524  -0.0057  0.4647 0.3297 0.0438 0.0013 
Across 
Economists 




285  -0.0053  0.4773 0.4912 0.1511 0.0217 
Across  22 
Economists 
22  -0.0247  0.2745 0.5144 0.3167 0.1631 
 
Notes) 1. Obs is the number of observations in the sample.   
2.  R S  is the average Sharpe ratio from the survey forecasts. 
3. Std is the standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio from the survey forecasts. 
  4. The 4
th and 5
th rows in each panel (Observations from 22 Economists and 
Across 22 Economists) show results with observations forecasted by  
economists who reported more than 50% of the time, not necessarily  
consecutively. 
 5.  ) ln ( : 0 C SR H ∆ ≥ γσ  is the null hypothesis of Implication 1 derived from  
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
6. : 0 H ) ln ( C SR ∆ = γσ  is the null hypothesis of Implication 3 derived from  
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). 
7. Numbers in the 5
th, 6
th and 7
th columns in each panel show the p-values for 
each hypothesis. 
8. Dividends data are used for the test assuming that the stock is the dividend 
claim. 
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TABLE 4 
12-month Sharpe Ratio and Bound with Dividend Data 
 
) ln ( : 0 C SR H ∆ ≥ γσ    Obs  R S   Std 
2 = γ   5 = γ   472 . 8 = γ  
All 
Observations 
516  0.0492  0.4788 0.9168 0.4850 0.0463 
Across 
Economists 




285  0.0410  0.5141 0.7545 0.3840 0.0761 
Across  22 
Economists 
22  0.0230  0.3244 0.5168 0.3499 0.1910 
: 0 H ) ln ( C SR ∆ = γσ    Obs  R S   Std 
2 = γ  5 = γ  472 . 8 = γ  
All 
Observations 
516  0.0492  0.4788 0.1664 0.9700 0.0926 
Across 
Economists 




285  0.0410  0.5141 0.4909 0.7680 0.1523 
Across  22 
Economists 
22  0.0230  0.3244 0.9664 0.6997 0.3820 
 
Notes) 1. Obs is the number of observations in the sample.   
2.  R S  is the average Sharpe ratio from the survey forecasts. 
3. Std is the standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio from the survey forecasts. 
  4. The 4
th and 5
th rows in each panel (Observations from 22 Economists and 
Across 22 Economists) show results with observations forecasted by  
economists who reported more than 50% of the time, not necessarily  
consecutively. 
 5.  ) ln ( : 0 C SR H ∆ ≥ γσ  is the null hypothesis of Implication 1 derived from  
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
6. : 0 H ) ln ( C SR ∆ = γσ  is the null hypothesis of Implication 3 derived from  
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). 
7. Numbers in the 5
th, 6
th and 7
th columns in each panel show the p-values for 
each hypothesis. 
8. Dividends data are used for the test assuming that the stock is the dividend 
claim. 
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TABLE 5 
Bias Test with Individual Forecasts 
 
Consumption Data  Dividend Data  Economists 
i φ   t-statistic  i φ   t-statistic 
171 1.3788  10.0108  1.3758  9.9838 
250  0.2814 2.1381 0.2786 2.1124 
258  0.7451 7.0462 0.7444 7.0322 
264  0.5392 6.9522 0.5391 6.9418 
270  0.4276 4.9796 0.4262 4.9575 
276  0.3911 4.2161 0.3936 4.2374 
288  0.4243 5.7521 0.4246 5.7481 
312  0.2662 2.2709 0.2652 2.2586 
324  0.6265 6.6132 0.6247 6.5879 
378  0.2330 2.8250 0.2336 2.8293 
379  0.8877 6.8873 0.8863 6.8693 
389  0.0580 0.6505 0.0597 0.6680 
393  0.3992 4.4751 0.4017 4.4976 
394  0.8706 6.9610 0.8726 6.9675 
399  0.4300 3.4852 0.4323 3.4995 
403  0.4444 3.9563 0.4464 3.9700 
424  0.5577 4.7871 0.5618 4.8188 
426  1.1098 9.0660 1.1136 9.0838 
427  0.3654 3.0730 0.3697 3.1059 
430  1.2997 9.3504 1.3032 9.3595 
438  0.7175 5.2309 0.7211 5.2482 
444  0.2081 1.6630 0.2121 1.6925 
 
Notes) 1.  i φ  denotes individual bias. 
  2. T-statistics are from the Generalized Method of Moments allowing three- 
dimensional forecast errors (individual bias, aggregate shocks, and idiosyncratic  
errors).    29
TABLE 6 
Structural Break Test for Individual Biases  
 










i φ   t-
statistic 
i φ   t-
statistic
i φ   t-
statistic 
i φ   t-
statistic
250  0.4938 3.2075 -1.630 -1.952 0.4898 3.1807 -1.622 -1.943 
264  0.7080 8.0123 -1.261 -2.124 0.7071 8.0046 -1.253 -2.110 
276  0.4936 4.7815 -1.043 -1.249 0.4957 4.8023 -1.036 -1.240 
288  0.5917 7.0790 -1.584 -2.667 0.5913 7.0760 -1.576 -2.654 
378  0.4058 4.1044 -1.495 -2.517 0.4057 4.1052 -1.487 -2.505 
393  0.5567 5.6293 -1.963 -2.351 0.5589 5.6520 -1.955 -2.342 
399  0.7444 4.9625 -1.247 -2.099 0.7456 4.9712 -1.239 -2.086 
403  0.6012 4.5213 -0.967 -2.896 0.6027 4.5334 -0.960 -2.875 
424  0.8392 6.1615 -1.507 -2.537 0.8428 6.1894 -1.499 -2.525 
427  0.7054 4.6992 -1.902 -3.202 0.7091 4.7234 -1.893 -3.188 
 F-statistic:  13.2442  F-statistic: 13.2430 
 
Notes) 1.  i φ  denotes individual bias. 
  2. T-statistics are from the Generalized Method of Moments allowing three- 
dimensional forecast errors (individual bias, aggregate shocks, and idiosyncratic  
errors).  
3. F-statistic shows the test results about whether  i φ  during the period of Jun.  
1992-Dec.2000 is equal to  i φ  during the period of Jun. 2001-Dec. 2001. 
  4. This division of the sample period follows the decision of NBER Business  
  Cycle Dating Committee, which says that the last expansion ended in March 2001. 